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Hi Mark,

You touch upon predictability and chaos theory, and still show yourself unsatisfied with the notion that free will and conscioness ought to be more our inability to predict the actions of humans beings. Why is that? From your text, I can't really see where you see that falling short. From the discussion of quantum stuff to computability, you have clearly thought through this for while, hence my curiosity.

FWIW, I have written about all this a couple years ago (https://bonitao.medium.com/the-wanda-maximoff-illusion-68f513a0f49, and here is the paywall free version: https://bonitao.substack.com/p/the-wanda-maximoff-illusion-68f513a0f49). Not sure if my text has anything novel for you, but you may still find it interesting, if anything for its optimistic wrap up.

Would be curious to know your thoughts on why what we call conscious is not "what we feel cannot grasp how it could be predicted". Is it a more of a semantics opposition, or a philosophical one? Or maybe you just find the whole idea ludicrous?

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Thanks -- I think you cover a lot of similar ideas in your piece.

I think most people, if they asked, "what does it mean to have free will?", were to receive the answer, "it means it is impossible to predict what you will do," would find that unsatisfying. Maybe I'm wrong. I know I find it completely unsatisfying. I also think that the common notion of free will - that I can stand apart from everything, and make a decision free of all constraints and influences -- is logically inconsistent and meaningless.

I wouldn't say my arguments are mere semantics, or especially philosophical. I just want to know what's actually going on!

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